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O. Introduction 
In ~tn influential paper [16] Vaught defined a prime model of a complete theory 
to be a model of the theory ~hich can be elementarily embedded in every model 
of the theory. He established the following fundamental facts about prime 
mode!Is: 
(1) a model is prime iff it is countable and atomic; 
(2) a complete theory has a prime model if[ it satisfies a simple syntactical 
condition; 
(3) a complete theory has at most one prime model (up to isomorphism). 
The main facts about prime models were discovered independently by 
Svenonius [15]. 
In this paper we investigate the corresp¢,nding concept in which ~.~ementary 
embeddings are replaced by (isomorphic) embeddings. 
Definition. ~I is an algebraically prime model of T if 9~ is a model of T and 9/can 
be embedded in every model of T. 
Our interest is to develop, as far as possible, a theory of algebraically prime 
models analogous to Vaugbt's theory outlined above. Hence, we first discuss what 
seem to us to be the characteristic features of Vaught's development. 
We will recall the definition of atomic in the next section. For now, we wish to 
point out that being atomic is a syntactical property of a model, since it is a 
condition referring just to formulas satisfied in the model. This contrasts with 
being prime which refers to some (set-theoretic) relations between this model and 
other models, and is thus a semantic property of a model. 
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The point of (1) is that it gives an equivalence between syntactic and semantic 
properties. Similarly, in (2) a semantic property of a theory (having a model of a 
certain kind) is shown to be equivalent o a syntactical condition, that is, a 
condition referring just to sentences which are consequences of the theory. 
The key fact in what Vaught established is number ~i). Numbers (2) and (3) are 
really facts about countable atomic models which transfer to prime models by 
number (1). Thus, here we will emphasize the analogues of atomic models and try 
to connect hem to algebraically prime (abbreviated a.p.) models. 
A large number of notions of atomicity are introduced in Section 1, and their 
connections with each other and with a.p. models are investigated. Unfortunately, 
none of them coincides (on countable models) with the a.p. models, although all 
the countable models of several atomicity types are a.p. This is not surprising, 
since it is easily seen that even a complete universal theory may have infinitely 
many non-isomorphic a.p. models, and it is not reasonable to expect l~em all to 
satisfy some atomicity notion (which is a sort of definability criterion), It is more 
reasonable to hope that a theory with an a.p. model will also have an a.p. model 
satisfying some atomicity condition. 
In Section 2 we examine the conditions that a theory has an atomic model of 
one of the kinds introduced in ,Section 1. Using an omitting types theorem we 
translate these into syntactical conditions on the theory (for the four primary 
kinds of atomicity). Thus we get atomic model versions of Vaught's number (2). 
However, having an a.p. model is not equivalent o satisfying any of these 
syntactical conditions. 
In Section 3 we look at various semantic strengthenings of the notion of 
algebraically prime and obtain results of the sort we have been seeking. These 
strengthenings are the 'nice' a.p. models, which are so-called because they not 
only have embeddings into all other models of the theory but we are also told how 
an embedding can be built up one point at a time. Two kinds of nice a.p. models 
are precisely the countable models atisfying two of our atomicity conditions. We 
thus obtain, for these two notions of nice a.p. models, the full analogues of (1) and 
(2); since these two kinds of nice a.p. models were shown in Section 2 to be 
unique we also obtain the analogues of (3). 
At this point we should say precisely what kinds of theories we consider in our 
theorems and counterexamples. The theories of the elementary case, namely 
arbitrary complete theories (in a countable language), form a class which is both 
too restrictive and too broad. Allowing theories which contain as axioms arbitrary 
sentences (i.e., of unbounded complexity) is too broad, and restricting to theories 
which decide arbitrary sentences i  too narrow. We do, of course, continue just to 
c~nsider countable languages. 
The kinds of formulas and sentences considered should be determined by the 
sort of embedding one is concerned with. In this paper, since we deal with 
arbitrary embeddings, the properties of elements of models (i.e., formulas) that 
are relevant are those properties preserved by suci,~ embeddings, namely those 
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definable by existential formulas. We will think of such formulas as giving, very 
loosely, the 'algebraic' properties of elements. The kinds of sentences relevant, 
then, are those which enable us to state that one algebraic property implies 
another, namely the ~ sentences. 
Thus, we restrict our attention throughout this paper to ~ theories. 
But arbitrary ~ theories are too broad a class; we must make some complete- 
ness assumptions in order to get significant results. In what follows we explain and 
motivate the completeness assumptions used. 
If a model ~t is a prime for some theory it will be prime for the theory 
consisting of all sentences true on 9d. Similarly, if a model ~ is algebraically prime 
for some W~ theory it will be algebraically prime for the theory consisting of all ~'3 
sentences true on 9~. This theory we write as Thv3(gJ) and think of as giving all the 
'algebraic' properties of 9.  -4ow, The(92) is not usually complete, but it is always 
complete for existential sentences ~that is, if ~r is an existential sentence consistent 
with Thva(9~), then tr is a consequence of The(9.1)). 
Hence, we also restrict our attention to theories complete for existential sentences. 
Sometimes a greater degree of completeness i  necessary. There may be V3 
sentences consistent with Thv3(9-I) which are not consequences of this theory. But 
any V"J theory complete for existential sentences i contained in a unique maximal 
consistent V~ theory T*, and this theory T* is complete for ~ sentences (that is, 
every ~ sentence consistent with T* is a consequence of T*). If T* is this 
maximal V3 extension of Thva(~), we think of T* as giving all the 'algebraic' 
properties consistent with ~. If T*= Thva(9~), then the 'algebraic' properties of 9~ 
decide all 'algebraic' properties, and it is more likely that Thw(~) will be 
algebraically well-behaved. 
So, we will find that sometimes better results hold of theories complete for 
sentences. 
Thus, our results in Sections 1 through 3 are for V3 theories complete for 
existential sentences, and occasionally require completeness for V:I sentences. In 
both situations the primary case we have in mind is Thva(9~) for some 9~. Similarly, 
our counterexamples are all theories of the form Thw(~d) and are usually 
complete for ~ sentences. 
We now return to the outline of the contents of this paper. In Section 4 we 
consider theories which also satisfy other, more special, requirements. In two 
cases we can show that a theory satisfying additional requirements has an a.p. 
model iff it has a model of one of our atomicity kinds. Thus for these special 
theories we get the full analogues of Vaught's (2). At least one of the special 
requirements i natural since it essentially reduces to a (strong) amalgamation 
property. 
Section 5 concerns universal theories, and we find that some ~esults can be 
improved over what happens for ~'3 theories. In particular, we give a syntactical 
characterization of the universal theories (complete for existential sentences) 
having a.p. models. We also look briefly at universal theories which are not 
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complete for existential sentences and indicate by examples the difficulties in- 
volved with a.p. models for such theories. 
Section 6 is a short conclusion, in which we summarize the main positive results 
of the paper and indicate the main questions left open. 
As in any paper which contains such a large number of basic notions, an 
important role is played by the correspondingly large number of examples we 
have concerning the existence, properties and behavior of a.p. models. In order 
not to slow down the development of the paper we have collected the examples 
together in the last section. Throughout the rest of the paper we refer to the 
examples in Section 7 by number when we claim that certain behavior can occur. 
Of course the authors did not invent algebraically prime models. They were 
defined (before Vaught's paper [16]) by A. Robinson (see [11]), but he only used 
them in case the theory is model-complete, when they become simply (elementar- 
ily) prime models. 
The first paper we are aware of to attempt to produce results on a.p. models 
similar to Vaught's is [10] by Pouzet. He deals with two sorts of atomic models, 
one of them very briefly. He notes the conditions on a theory under which these 
atomic models are a.p. (when countable). Most of his attention is devoted to the 
exigtence and properties of just one sort of atomic model. Although he syntacti- 
cally characterizes theories having such atomic models (thus obtaining an atomic- 
ity analogue of Vaught's (2)~ he never establishes an equivalence between any 
primeness and any atomicity conditions (like Vaught's (1), or the full form of (2)). 
More precise references will be given at the appropriate places in the text of this 
paper. 
Simmons [14] follows Pouzet, dealing with basically the same material in a 
different way, and does not obtain substantially different results relevant o our 
work. Both Pouzet and Simmons left questions open which we have examples to 
answer. In addition, Shelah [12] and Forrest [3] have results on a.p. models which 
we will refer to later. 
The theory of a.p. models (as pointed out, e.g., in [5]) has not had as 
satisfactory a development asthat of prime models. One of the primary difficulties 
(as we will see in detail, though not dwelt upon) is that the existential formulas are 
not closed under negations. If they were (as is the case when a theory is 
model-complete), then all would run much more smoothly. 
Most of our terminology and notation is standard (or at least common). Some 
less familiar matter is dealt with here. 
Definition. A formula q~(~) is a A-formula (w.r.t. T) if there are existential 
formulas 0~(~) and 02(x) such that 
T~(q~--~bl) and T~(-lq~--~b2). 
Thus the A-formulas are those invariant under emheddings between models of 
T. Toge:her with the existential formulas (which we sometimes call the ~- 
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formulas) they form the basic classes of formulas used to define predicates in a.p. 
mc, dels. We also will occasionally have need to refer to the class H of universal 
formulas, which come in as negations of existential formulas. 
Note that the A-formulas are defined relative to a theory T. Frequently 
reference to T will be suppressed, however, both when speaking of A-formulas 
and in other contexts. Thus, a formula said to be consistent will be consistent with 
T, a formula said to imply another will do so on all models of T, etc. Whenever 
there is possibility of confusion, the dependence on the T in question will be 
made explicit. 
Definition. (i) (92, ao . . . . .  a,,-1)==>r (~, bo . . . . .  b._l) means that for every formula 
q~(Xo . . . . .  x,- l)  in F, if 92~q~(fi), then ~q~(/~). 
(ii) (~, f i ) - r (~ ,  b) means that (92, a)~r(~,  f~) and (~,/~) ~r  (92, ti). 
In this paper, the classes allowed for F in the above potations will always be 
either A or ,~. 
Finite sequences will frequently be abbreviated by t~, ~ etc. The iength of the 
sequence is either determined by the context or is irrelevant. 
A number of colleagues made helpful comments while the work for this paper 
was being done. We especially wish to thank J. Schmerl for some useful remarks 
during the final stages of its preparation. The second author also wishes to thank 
the Mathematics Department at the University of Connecticut for their invitation 
to spend Logic Year, 1979-1980, at Connecticut, which has provided the peaceful 
and pleasant atmosphere in which the final draft was written. 
1. Notions of atomicity 
Recall that a model is atomic if every n-tuple of its elements satisfies a 
complete formula in the model. As pointed out in Section 0, whea looking at 
algebraically prime models we are not concerned with all formulas but just those 
in certain classes. We are thus led to the following general definition. 
Definition. The formula q~(x~ . . . . .  x,) is Complete for F-[ormutas (w.r.t. T) if ¢ is 
consistent with T and for every formula ~k(xl . . . . .  x,) in F having no more free 
variables than q~ either 
TI :V~ (q~ --~ ~) or T I :V~ (q~ --~ -nqJ). 
Equivalently, a consistent q~(~) is complete for F-formulas provided whenever 
~(£) is a F-formula and (~^~)  is consistent with T, then T~(q~ ~ 4). 
Dd~aioL  92 is a (/'1, Fz)-atomic mode! of T ff 92 is a model of T and for every 
n, every n-tuple of elements of A satisfies in 92 some formula in F1 which is 
complete for F2-formulas~ 
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We argued in Section 0 that the predicates of elements in a.p. models that are 
relevant to our discussion are those preserved under embeddings, hence given by 
existential formulas. So Ft will always be either 2~ or A. The formulas that a given 
~o implies that are relevant are those which say something about the embeddibility 
of a tuple satisfying ~o - -  that is, the formulas preserved by embeddings and their 
negations. So F2 will always be el:her ,S, H or A. But dearly a formula is complete 
for existential formulas iff it is complete for universal formulas. Therefore, we 
have four sorts of atomic model coming from this definition, and each I'~ will be 
either ,Y, or A 
Now, there is another way of defining atomic (in the usual elementary case), 
and that is if every n-tuple satisfies a formula which implies all the other formulas 
satisfied by the n-tuple. Of course, when talking about all formulas this agrees 
with the first definition; but the (F~, F2)-versions may d~ffer. 
Definition. 9/is a weak (/'1, F2)-atomic model of T if 9i is a model of T and for 
every n, every n-tuple ~ of elements of A satisfies in 9/zome formula q,(~) in F1 
such that T~k¢~ (q~--~ 4) whenever 4(x) is in /'2 and 9/~4(a). 
We will consider these models when Ft is either ,~ or A and when F2 is either ,~ 
or A or //, for the reasons given by the discussion after the previous definition. 
With weak atomic models one cannot always get rid of the case F2 =// ,  but luckily 
three sorts of weak atomicity coincide with the strong versions. 
Note that it is clear from the definitions that any (Ft, F2)-atomic model is also 
weak (1"~, F?)-atomic. 
Lemma 1.1. Assume T is complete for existential sentences. If 9/ is a weak 
(F, A)-atomic model of T, then 9/ is (F, A)-atomic; if 9/ is a weak (A, 2~)-atomic 
model of T, then 9/ is (A, Z)-atomic. 
Proof. The first stateme,-.t !~ clear, since the A-formulas are closed under nega- 
tions. For the second, let 9/be weak (A,)S)-atomic, let ~ be from A, and let 0(i) 
be a A-formula satisfied by ~ and which implies all the existential formulas 
satisfied by fi in 9/. We will show 0 is actually complete for existential formulas. 
Let 4(~) be existential and consistent with O. Then 9/gO(/~)/x4(b') for some /7 
since T is complete for existential sentences. Let 0' be the A-formula satisfied 
/7 which implies all the existential formulas 5 satisfies. Then T~(O'-~ 4). N~- , 0 
is complete for A-formulas and 0 is consistent with 0'; hence T~(O ~ 0q, ,nd so 
T~(O ~ 4). Therefore, 0 is complete for existentaai formulas, and 9/ is a (~, 2~)- 
atomic model of T. 
We thus have seven notions of atomicity to deal with. Our first theorem 
connects them with each other and with being algebraically prime. 
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Theorem 1.2. Assume that T is ccmplete for exis:ential sentences, and let 9~ be a 
countable model of T. 
(a) Then (i)~(ii)~(iii):~,(iv)^(vi), (i)=>(i)*~(v)=>(vi), (ii)~,(ii)*=>(vi), and 
(i)* ::> (ii)*, where: 
(i) 92 is (A, Y,)-atomic, 
(i)* 9/ /s weak (a, H)-atomic, 
(ii) 9~ is (~, Y,)-atomic, 
(ii)* ~ is weak (:£, ID-atomic, 
(iii) 9~ is weak (2~, $)-atomic, 
(iv) 92 is a.p., 
(v) 9~ is (a, a)-atomic, 
(vi) 9.I is (Ji, a)-atomic. 
(b) If T is complete for V3 sentences, then (i) ¢:> (i)* and (ii) ¢~ (ii)*. 
The only implication in part (a) which is not immediate from the definitions is 
the implication (iii)=>(iv), which is a consequence of the following lemma. 
LemmR 1.3. Let 92 be a weak (2~, 2~)-atomic model of T. Assume that 
(92, ao . . . . .  a , -1)=~(~,  bo . . . . .  b.-O 
where fO is some model of T. Then for any a. e A there is some b. ~ B such that 
(92, ao . . . . .  a , )~3(~, bo . . . . .  b,). 
Proof. Let q~(Xo . . . .  , x,--1) be existential, satisfied by ao . . . . .  a,,_l in 92, and imply 
every existential formula satisfied by ao . . . . .  a,,-1 in 92. Let ~(Xo . . . . .  x,) do the 
same for ao . . . . .  a,. Then T~(~¢--->3x,$) and ~0(bo  . . . . .  bn-1), hence there is 
some b, such that ~9~b(bo . . . . .  b,), and this b, will be as desired. 
We can now show (iii)~(iv) of (a). Let 92 be countable and weak (,~, 2)-atomic, 
and let ~ be any model of T. Then 92~ since T is complete for existential 
sentences, and Lemma 1.3 can be applied repeatedly where A ={ai: i e to} to 
build up step by step an embedding of 92 into ~. Details of this standard 'forth' 
argument can be left to the reader. 
Part (b) of Theorem 1.2 is an immediate consequt nce of the next result, which 
establishes the precise relation between (F, ~,)-atomic models and weak (F, H)- 
atomic models, and is thus e4' independent interest. Since we refer to three 
di'fferent heories in this theorem we use 'w.r.t.' to indicate which theory is under 
consideration i  each atomicity context. 
Theorem 1.4. Assume that T is complete [or existential sentences, and let T* be T 
together with every V.q sentence which is (separately) consistent with T. Let 92 be a 
model of T. Then the [ollowing are equivalent (where F is A or Y,): 
(i) 92 is weak (F, H)-atomic w.r.t. T, 
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(ii) ~2(~T* and 92 is (F,~)-atomic w.r.t. T*, 
(iii) ~ is (F, £)-atomic w.r.t. Thw(~).  
Proof. (ii)~(iii): By (ii) any sequence fi from A satisfies a F-formula ~0(~) which 
is complete for existential formulas w.r.t. T*; that is, whenever 4(x) is existential, 
then either T*~V~ (q~ ---> 4) ,or T* =V~ (~0 ---> -a4). But each of these sentences i
V3, and 9AV T* by (ii), hence either 
Thva(~)~V~ ( p --~ 4) or Thv3(~)~V~ (~ -~, 74). 
Theretore ~ is complete for existential formulas w.r.t. Thv~(~), and so (iii) holds. 
(iii)=>(i): By (iii) any sequence ~ from A satisfies a F-formula ¢~(~) such that 
whenever 0(~) is universal, then either 
Thva(~)l)~'d~ (¢p --~ 0) or Thva(~t)kV~ (tp --~ ~O). 
In particular, if 92k0(t~), then necessarily ~kV~ (q~--~ 0). But this sentence is 
universal, hence TkV£ (¢o--~ 0) since T is complete for existential sentences. 
Therefore 92 is weak (F, H)-atomic w.r.t.T. 
(i)~(ii): Assume 9.1 is weak (F, //)-atomic w.r.t.T. We first show that ~,1 is a 
model of T*. Let ~r be an V:l sentence, say cr is V:~4(~) where 4 is existential. If
~.1 ~Ttr, then ~1k74(~) for some ~ in A. But -74 is universal, hence there is some 
F-formula ~(~) such that ~¢o(~)  and TkV~ (q~--~"74). But TkZl~p since T is 
complete for existential sentences, o Tk3~ "74, i.e., Tkm~r. This shows that 92 
satisfies every V3 sentence consistent with T, so 91 is a model of T*. 
Now, let ~ be from A and let ~(~) be a F-formula such that ~kco(t~) and 
TI:(~.--~O) for every universal 0(~) such that ~(kO(~). We will show that ~p is 
complete for existential formulas w,r.t. T*, which will complete the proof. 
First, let 4(~) be any existential formula such that (~ A 4) is consistent with T. 
Then 9~(~) ,  since otherwise 92~m4(t~) and so Tk(q~--~-~4) since 74  is 
universal. 
So, let 4(x) be existential and consistent with ~. Then °d~4(~) by what we just 
showed. We claim that 9I~V,t (¢o--~ 4). If not, then ,~t~q~(/~)A-74(/~) for some /~. 
Then ~t~' (b )  for some Fqormula q)' such that T~:V~ (~'---~-~), since 74  is 
universal. But then (~/x ¢o') is consistent with T and q~' is existential, so by the 
previous paragraph 9~k ~p'(~). But then ~t: 74(~), contradicting our assumption. 
Thus 92kV£ (~--~ 4). But this sentence is V--J, hence T*kV~ (~-~4)  and ¢p is 
complete for existential formulas w.r.t. T*. 
We have thus completed the justification of Theorem 1.2, since T* = T if T is 
complete for V3 sentences. 
What Theorem 1.4 says is that if T is complete for existential sentences and 
is a weak (F, H)-atomic model of T, then 92 becomes a (F, ~)-atomic model (and 
so by Theorem 1.2 an a.p. model) of any extension of T which adds enough V:I 
sentences. Note that the proof of (i)=>(ii) of Theorem 1.4 yields the following: 
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CoroU~ 1.5. I f  91 is a weak (F,//}-atomic model o[ some theory complete for 
existential sentences, then Thva(91) is complete [or '~  sentences (if F is ~, or A ). 
Fully as important as Theorem 1.2 is the fact that no implications not given by 
it hold. In particular, an algebraically prime model need not satisfy any of our 
seven kinds of atomicity. Our counterexamples are all ~'3 theories complete for 
V3 sentences, unless this is ruled out by part (b) of Theorem 1.2. 
Examples. There are W~ theories complete for V3 sentences with countable 
models satisfying each of the following combinations (where the numbers refer to 
Theorem 1.2): (ii) A 7(i), (iii) A 7(ii), (iv) A 7(iii), (V) A ~(iv), (vi) A'~(V), (iv) A-n(vi), 
(ii) A-n(V); in addition there is an W-J theory complete for existential sentences with 
countable models satisfying (i)*A-n(iv). 
Various models of the theories in Examples C2, C3, or D1 show (ii)AT(i); 
(iii)A-7(ii) is shown by models of C1 or C3; (iv) A-7(iii) by C1 or C2; (V)A~(iv) by 
B3; (Vi)A~(V) by C1 or C2; (iV)A-n(vi) by C1 or C2; (ii)A-7(V) by C2; (i)*A-n(iv) 
by B1. 
At this point we stop to explain what Pouzet [10] and Simmons [14] did, and 
how their work fits in with the results of this section. 
Pouzet [10, 5.1.3] introduces (but leaves anonymous) what we have called weak 
(Z, Z)-atomic models. He notes that the countable ones are a.p. and asks whether 
the converse holds. We have already shown that the answer to his question is no 
by referring to two complete V3 theories (one even universal) which have a.p. 
models which are not weak (Z, ,~)-atomic. 
Except for this, all of Pouzet's work in [10] relevant o a.p. models concerns 
what we call weak (v, //)-atomic models, although he does not use the same 
definition we do. Assuming (for simplicity) that T is a theory complete for 
existential sentences, what he calls a '0-prehomogeneous' model of T is precisely 
a weak (Z, H)-atomic model of T (by [I0, 5.2.1] and our Theorem 1.4). His 
' l-atomic' models are somewhat weaker, but a 1-atomic model of the theory T* 
of Theorem 1.4 is precisely a weak (Y,, //)-atomic model of T. Our Theorem 1.4 
for F=Y, is essentially in his paper (see especi:.Jly his 5.4.1). In particular he 
shows (using our terminology) if, at a countable weak (~, H)-atomic model of T is 
an a.p. model of T* (and thus of T if T is complete for V3 sentences). Although 
the notion of a (2~, ~)-atomic model is implicit in much of this, he has no notion 
which is equivalent to being (2~, 2)-atomic unless the theory is complete for V3 
sentences. In particular, none of his results yields an a.p. model for any theory not 
complete for W~ sentences (except for his remark given in the previous para- 
graph). 
Simmons [14] mainly follows Pouzet: his 's.e.c.' models of T are precisely the 
weak (~,//)-atomic models of T; his result [14, 2.3] is equivalent to Theorem 1.4 
for F = ~; and he shows that a countable s.e.c, model of T is a.p. for T* [14, 2.7]. 
298 Z T. Baldwin, D.W. Kueker 
Just like Pouzet, he does not have the general concept of (~, $)-atomic, and his 
results yield a.p. models w.r.t. T just for theories T complete for W~ sentences. 
The papers of Forrest [3] and Shelah [12] are harder to fit into this outline, 
since they are concerned with more special situations. They both have some 
concept like (~, ~)-atomic, but [3] is interested just in universal theories with 
amalgamation and [12] looks just at the class of existentially closed models. These 
restrictions are related to the fact that they are both interested in models a.p. over 
sets. We will comment further on them in Section 4. 
In general, we have seen that (A, A)-atomicity is incomparable with being 
algebraically prime. Notice, however, that the examples howing that an a.p. 
model need not be (A, A)-atomic have no (A, A)-atomic models. This is no 
accident, as the case F = A of the next theorem shows. 
"Haeorem 1.6. If  T has a (A, F)-atomic model (where F is ~ or A), then all a.p. 
models of T are (A, F)-atomic. 
ProoL Let ~ be a (A, F)-atomic model of T and let 92 be a.p. We may then 
assume 92 ___ ~. If ao . . . . .  a, E A, then in ~ they satisfy some A-formula complete 
for F-formulas. Since A-formulas are preserved under submodels ao . . . . .  an 
satisfy the same a-formula in 92. Therefore 92 is also (A, F)-atomic. 
Similarly, our only example of d theory with a countable (A, zl)-atomic model 
which is not a.p, has no a.p. models. But here we do not know if this is essential. 
Question. If T is an V3 theory complete for V3 sentences with an a.p. model, must 
all countable (A, A)-atomic models of T be a.p.? 
If this question has a positive answer, then the a.p. models would coincide with 
the countable (A, A)-atomic models whenever both classes are non-empty. Exam- 
ples of V3 theories complete for existential sentences where this fails have been 
pointed out to the authors by C. Steinhorn and M. Kaufmann (the theory of linear 
orders with no last element is one such example). 
2. Existence and uniqueness 
In this section we investigate the relative strengths of the conditions asserting 
that T has one of our seven sorts of atomic model or an a.p. model. We obtain a 
theorem and attendant examples parallel to Theorem 1.2 and the examples 
following it. We will then look briefly at uniqueness questions for the various 
atomic models and a.p. models. 
First, however, we show that the existence of a (F~, F2)-atomic model (where 
each Fi is either 2; or A) is equivalent to a syntactical condition on T. As in the 
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elementary case, the main tool needed is an omitting types theorem. We will use 
the following refinement (from [4], see also [8, 5~) of the usual version. 
Theorem 2.L Let T be an V3 theory complete for existential sentences. For each 
,n ~ a~ and i ~ ~o let q~(Xo . . . . .  x,) be existential. Then T has a model satisfying 
A ,  V~ k/~ ¢~ if[for every n whenever ~k(xo . . . . .  x,)  is existential and consistent with 
T, then (O^q~?) is consistent with T for some i. 
Using Theorem 2.1 we can derive the desired characterizations of theories 
having (/'1, F2)-atomic models. 
Theozem 2.2. Let T be an V3 theory complete for existential sentences. Then: 
(i) T has a ( / ,  ,~)-atomic model if/every existential ~(~) consistent with T is 
i~pr, ied by some ~l-formula 0(~) complete for existential formulas. 
(ii) T has a (A, A )-atomic model iff every existential formula ~b(~) consistent with 
T is c gnsistent with some ~i-formula O(Yc) complete for/i.-formulas. 
(iii) T has a ($, F)-atomic model (where F is either ~ or /i) if[ every open 
formula consistent with T is implied by some existential formula complete for 
F-formulas 
Prool. For any of the four choices of (/'1,/'2) consider the condition 
every existential ff(~) consistent with T is consistent with some ( , )  
F~-formula q~(~) complete for F2-formulas. 
If T has a (F1, F2)-atomic model, then (*) holds since T is complete for 
existential sentences, and hence any existential formula consistent with T is 
satisfied on all models of T, in particular on a (F1, F2)-atomic model. 
Conversely, (*) guarantees the existence of a (F1, F2)-atomic model. Let, for 
each n, {¢~(x0 . . . . .  x,): i~to} list all Fl-formulas in xo, . . . ,x , ,  complete for 
F2-formulas. Then (*) says precisely that we can apply Theorem 2.1 to obtain a 
model 9A of T in which every n-tuple satisfies ome ¢~', that is, a (/'1, F2)-atomic 
model. 
This already shows (ii). 
Now note that if we are not in the case (A , / ) ,  then (*) is equivalent o the 
apparently stronger condition in which we demand T~(q~--~ ). 
This shows (i) and the left to right direction of (iii). 
To complete the proof we assume the condition stated in (iii) and show (*). Let 
0(:~) be existential and consistent with T. Then 0 is 313a(~, 17) for some open a. By 
assumption we get an existential formula 0(~, ~3) complete for F-formulas such 
that T~(O ~ a). But then 3~30 is also existential, complete for F-formulas, and 
T~(3OO--~3~a). That is, ~ is implied by an existential formula complete for 
F-formulas, hence (*) holds and T has a (2, F)-atomic model. 
300 Z T. Baldwin, D. W. Kueker 
Using Theorem 1.4 we can derive from this result syntactical characterizations 
of theories with weak (zl,//)-atomic or weak (~,//)-atomic models. We omit the 
straight-forward proof. 
Corollary 2.3. Let T be an W~ theory complete for existential sentences. Then T has 
a weak (F, l-D-atomic model (where F is either ,F, or A) iff every existential [ormula 
~(£) consistent with T is consistent with some F-formula q~(Y~) such that 
{existential 002): (t~ A 0) is consistent with T} U {q~(g)} 
is consistent with T (i.e., if Tg(¢  ~ Olv0:) where 0~, 02 are universal, then 
T~(t~--~ Ol) or T~(q~--~02)). 
Both Pouzet and Simmons have results equivalent o Corollary 2.3 for F=,X 
[10, 5.4.1; 14, 2.5]. Note that neither of them has the omitting types theorem at 
his disposal, and their methods for proving Corollary 2.3 seem to necessitate 
passing to a maximal V3 extension of T. This probably prevented them from 
obtaining the general concept of a (£, ,Y,V)-atomic model. 
We do not have any s:,ntactical characterization of the theories with a weak 
(,~, ~)-atomic model. The candidate suggested by Corollary 2.3 is much too weak. 
Example. There is an V3 theory T complete for Y'~ sentences with no a.p. model 
but such that every existential formulz tk(~) consistent with T is implied by an 
existential q~(~) such that 
{universal 0(£): (¢/x 0) is consistent with T}U{q~($)} 
is consistent with T. 
Example B3 contains such a theory. 
Our next result compares the conditions asserting the existence of the various 
sorts of atomic models, and corresponds to Theorem 1.2. 
Theo,rem 2.4. Let T be an V:! theory complete for existential sentences. 
(a) Then (i) ::> (ii)::> (iii) ~ (iv) ::> (vi), (i) ::> (i)* ~ (v)=), (vi), (ii) ::> (ii)* ::> (vi), and 
(i)*=), (ii)* where: 
(i) T has a (za, ~)-atomic model, 
(i)* T has a weak (a, lI)-atomic model, 
(ii) T has a (~, ~)-atomic model, 
(ii)* T has a weak (X, il)-atomic model, 
(iii) T has a weak (,~, Y,)-atomic model, 
(iv) T has an a.p. model, 
(v) T has a (A, A )-atomic model, 
(vi) T has a (~, A )-atomic model. 
(b) I f  T is complete for ~ sentences, then (i)¢#(i)* and (ii) ¢#(ii)*. 
Algebraically prime models 301 
l~aot. Since an elementary submodel of any kind of atomic model is again an 
atomic model of the same kind, a theory has countable atomic models if it has any 
at all. Therefore, all parts of this Theorem are immediate from Theorem 1.2 
except the implication (iv) => (vi). So, assume that T has an algebraically prime 
model 91. Let a0 . . . . .  a, e A and let {0~(2): i e to} list all the zl-formulas atisfied 
by ~ in 9~. Since 9/is a.p. we know there is no model of T satisfying V~V~ m0~. 
Since -n0~ is existential we can apply Theorem 2.1 to get an existential formula 
~(~) consistent with T such that T~(~--~O~) for all i~to. This ~ is hence 
complete for A-formulas, and also implies any open formula satisfied by a in 9~. 
Every open formula consistent with T is satisfied by some ao . . . . .  a, ~ A, and 
therefore is implied by some existential formula complete for A-formulas. By 
Theorem 2.2(iii) T has a (~,, za)-atomic model. 
Oo.ce again, examples how that no other implications hold. In particular, the 
existence of an a.p. model is not equivalent o the existence of any one of our 
3cven kinds of atomic models. 
Examples. There are W~ theories complete for ~ sentences satisfying each of the 
following: (ii)Am(i), (iii)A'n(ii), (V)Am(iv), (Vi)Am(V). There are V3 theories 
complete for existential sentences atisfying: (iV)Am(iii), (i)*Am(iv). 
The theories in Examples C2, C3, or D1 will show (ii)Am(i); (iii)Am(ii) is 
shown by C1; (V)Am(iv) by B3; (Vi)Am(V) by C1 or C2; (iv)Am(iii) by C4; 
(i)*A~(iv) by B1. 
Notice that (unlike the situation in the previous ection) we have been unable to 
decide the status of one implication when T is complete for V3 sentences. This 
gives the first open question which is central to the theme of this paper. 
Question. If an ~=d theory complete for V3 sentences has an a.p. model, must it 
have a weak (~,, ~)-atomic model? " 
Also notice that in Theorem 2.4 we are not saving that if T has an a.p. model, 
then it has an a.p. model which is (,~, A)-atomic. As far as we know, it is possible 
for T to have a.p. models but no a.p. models which are also (,~, A)-atomic. This 
leads to the second open problem which seems important o the spirit of this 
paper. 
Question. If T is an W~ theory complete for existential sentences (or, even for b'3 
sentences) which has an a.p. model, must T have a (~, zl)-atomic a.p. model? 
It is worth remarking here that both adding or taking away W~ sentences may 
change whether a theory has an a.p. model. 
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Examples. There are pairs T, To of Y=J theories complete for existential sentences 
such that T has no a.p. model but To has an a.p. model, and: (a) To c _ T, or (b) 
T~ Yo. 
The theories in B2 show (a), those in B1 show (b). 
In general, ag Examples C1, C2 and C3 show, an ~ theory (even if complete) 
may have infinitely many non-isomorphic a.p. models. In the remainder of this 
section we investigate what sort of uniqueness properties do hold. 
We first show that T can have at most one countable (~, ~)-atomic model. 
Theorem 2.5. Let T be complete for existential sentences. Then any two countable 
(~, ~)-atomic models of T are isomorphic. 
Proof. Let 92 and ~ be (.~, ~)-atomic models of T. qhen 92--3~ since T is 
complete for existential sentences. Now assume that 
(92, ao . . . . .  a~- , ) - -3 (~,  bo . . . . .  b~_l) 
and let an ~ A be given. Since 92 is (2~, ~)-atomic there is some existential 
q~(Xo . . . . .  x.) complete for existential formulas and su~:h that 92~ff(ao . . . . .  a.). 
Then 3x.~ is existential and satisfied by ao . . . . .  a._l. Our assumption implies 
that 3x,~tk is satisfied by bo . . . . .  b._t in ~, so there :is some b. e B such that 
~(bo  . . . . .  b.). Then clearly (92, ao . . . . .  a . )=~(~,  bo . . . . . .  b.). Since ~ is also 
(~, ~)-atomic we can reverse the mi,~s of 92 and ~. Tkus we see that we have a 
back-and-forth relation, so 92 and ~ are isomorphic if both are countable. 
As an immediate consequence of this and Theorem 1.4 we obtain the following, 
which was proved by Simmons [14, 2.7]. 
Corollary 2.6. A theory complete for existential sentences has at most one countable 
weak (~, II)-atomic model. 
Theorem 2.5 does not say that if T has a (,~,)2)-atomic model, then it has just 
one a.p. model. Also, despite the fact that Lemma 1.3 gives half of a back-and- 
forth for weak (2~, ~)-atomic models, they are not necessarily unique. 
Example. There is a complete V=! theory with a (~, ~)-atomic model which also 
has infinitely many non-isomorphic countable weak (2~, 2~)-atomic models. 
The theory in Example C3 has these properties. 
In particular it follows from Theorem 2.5 that a theory complete for existential 
sentences has at most one (A, ~)-atomic model. But in fact we can say much 
more. 
Algebraically wime models 303 
Th~rem 2.7. Let T be complete for existential sentences and assume T has a 
(A, £)-atomic model. Then T has exactly one a.p. model. 
Proof. Theorem 2.4 implies that T has an a.p. model, Theorem 1.6 says that 
every a.p. model of T must be (A, 2~)-atomic, so Theorem 2.5 yields the 
conclusion° 
Unfortunately the converse to this result fails. 
Example. There is a complete W=I theory with exactly one a.p. model but with no 
(A, ~)-atomic model 
This is shown by Example D1. 
Does the assumption that T has exactly one a.p. model imply anything about 
the atomicity of this a.p. model? We do not even know if it must be (2, A)-atomic 
(eft. our earlier question), but the more interesting question is whether it must be 
(,~, ~)-atomic (because of Theorem 2.5). Example D2 is a counter-example, but 
this theory is only complete for existential sentences. Thus we raise the following 
problem. 
Question. If an ~ theory complete for Y3 sentences has exactly one a.p. model, 
must it have a (~, 2~)-atomic model? 
Simmons (at the end of [14, Section 4] asks for an example to show the failure 
of a certain implication. If T is an ~ theory complete for W-A sentences, then he is 
asking for a counterexample to the assertion that T is ~o-categorical provided T 
has a countable (~, ,~)-atomic model into which every countable model of T can 
be embedded. Two of our examples (C2 and C3) are complete V3 theories which 
are not ~o-categorical lthough all of their countable models can be embedded 
into their countable (~, ~)-atomic models. Thus we settle Simmon's problem in 
the expected way. 
In all the examples referred to so far T either has no a.p. models, or exactly 
one, or exactly oJ many. An obvious question to ask is whether these are all the 
possibilities. 
Examp!es. There are universal theories complete for existential sentences with 
exactly n a.p. models (any 1 < n <eJ) and there is a complete V3 theory with 2 °' 
nonisomorphic a.p. models. 
These theories are provided in Examples E1 and E2. 
Question. Are there W~ theories complete for V3 sentences with exactly n a.p. 
models (1 < n < 0)? 
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3, Special kinds of algebraically prime models 
In the preceding two sections we have not been able to characterize the a.p. 
models of T, nor have we been able to characterize the theories having a.p. 
models. The best behaved atomicity notions ((~, $)-atomic and (zl, ~)-atomie) are 
strictly stronger than algebraically prime. This leads to the feeling that there is a 
more natural notion of algebraically prime which is stronger than the one we have 
introduced. In this section we introduce three natural semantic strengthenings of 
a.p. and see how they fit in. 
Returning to the elementary case for inspiration, we note that if ~I is a prime 
model of T, then not only can 91 be elementarily embedded in every model of T, 
but such a map can be defined one point at a time since 91 has the following 
property: if (91, ao . . . . .  a,_~)--- (~3, bo . . . . .  b,-t), then for any a, cA  there is some 
b, e B such that (91, ao . . . . .  a,) =- (~, bo . . . . .  b,). 
Looking at this in our context we are led to three nice kinds of algebraicaJty 
prime models. 
Definition. (a) 92 is a 2f,-nice a.p. model of T if 92 is a countable model of T and for 
every model ~ of T, every n ~ to, and all a0 . . . . .  a,-1 ~ A, bo . . . . .  b,-1 ~ B if 
(91, ao . . . . .  a,,-~)~3(~, bo . . . . .  b,-1), 
then for every a, ~ A there is some b, ~ B such that 
(92, ao . . . . .  a . )~3 (~, bo . . . . .  b,). 
(b) 92 is a Y,*-nice a.p. model of T if the condition in (a) holds with '~3 '  
replaced both places it occurs by ' -~' .  
(c) 91 is a A-nice a.p. model of T if the condition in (a) holds with '~3'  replaced 
6~th places it occurs by '~a' -  
First ~ote that these are a.p. models of T if T is complete for existential 
sentences, since then 92-3~ whenever 91 and ~ are models of T, and the 
definitions then allow us to build up embeddings of a nice 91 into any model ~ of 
T. Thus, in the definition of algebraically prime 'nice'-ness replaces the second 
order quantifier 'there is an embedding' by an arithmetical property, thus simp- 
lifying the form of the definition. We will return to this in Section 6. 
Note that, when T is complete for existential sentences, 91 is a S-nice a.p. 
model of T i f f  whenever ~ is a model of T and (91, fi)::>~(~,/~), then (92, tl) is 
isomorphic to a submodel of (~,/~). We may similarly reword the definition of 
A-nice. This establishes that A-nice implies ~-nice. It is not immediately clear 
how ~*-nice fits in (since (92, a )c (~,  a) does not imply (91, a) -~(~,a) ) ,  but we 
will see it is strictly intermediate between A-nice and ,~-nice. 
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We first remark that Lemma 1.3 exactly shows the following: 
Theorem 3.1. If 91 is a countable weak (X, X)-atomic model of T, then 91 is a 
,~-nice a.p. model of T. 
We can show that X-nice is strictly intermediate between weak (~, X)-atomic 
and a.p. 
Examples. There are complete Y'~ theories (i) with a.p. models which are not 
X-nice, and (ii) with X-nice a.p. models which are not (,~, z~)-atomic. 
The theory of Example C1 shows (i), and C2 shows (ii). 
We know less about the strength of the condition that T has a X-nice a.p. 
model. 
Example. There is an V3 theory complete for existential sentences which has a 
X-nice a.p. model but no weak (X, X)-atomic model. 
Example C4 has this property. 
Unfortunately, we do not know if an Y3 theory complete for V3 sentences with 
a E-nice a.p. model must have a weak (,~, ~)-atomic model (this is a sharpening of 
a question from the previous section). More importantly we do not know the 
answer to the following question. 
Question. If T is an V3 theory complete for existential sentences (or, for V3 
sentences) which has a~ a.p. model, must T have a X-nice a.p. model? 
This is perhaps the most important open question in the paper, and we will 
comment on its significance in Section 6. 
We are able to completely determine the relatior~ of X*-nice a.p. models to our 
other concepts. Most importantly, if the theory is c6mplete for ~'3 sentences, then 
they coincide with the (,~, X)-atomic models. 
Recall that 91 is an existentially closed (e.c.) model of T if whenever 91 c_ ~ for a 
model ~ of T, then (91, a ) -~(~,  ~) for all ~ in A. 
Tlheolrem 3.2. Let T be an V3 theory complete for existential sentences, and let 91 be 
a countable model of T. 
(a) Then ( i )~( i i )#( i i i )  and (ii)¢~(ii)* where: 
(i) 91 is (X, X)-atomic, 
(ii) 9.( is X*-nice, 
(ii)'91/s e.c. and X-nice, 
(iii) 92 is weak (X, II)-atomic. 
(b) If T is complete for V3 sentences, then (i), (ii), (ii)* and (iii) are all 
equivalent. 
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Proot. Part (b) is 
which tells us that 
The implication 
assumption that 
the roles of 92 and 
(ii)=>(iii): Let 92 
an immediate consequence of part (a) and Theorem 2.4(b), 
(iii)~(i) when T is complete for ~ sentences. 
(i)~(ii) follows from our proof of Theorem 2.5, since the 
is also (2, 2~)-atomie was not used until we wanted to reverse 
be ~*-nice, let ao . . . . .  an e A, and let {O~(~): i e o~} list all the 
universal formulas atisfied by ~ in 92. Using the definition of ~*-niceness n + 1 
thnes we see that for any model ~ of T there are bo . . . . .  b, e B such that 
(92, ti)-a(~,/~), in particular bo . . . .  , b,, satisfy all the formulas 0~ (iEoJ) in ~. 
Thus T has no model satisfying W2 ~/~ ~0~. Since 70t is existential we obtain by 
Theorem 2.1 an existential formula q~(~) consistent with T such that T~(~/,---~ 0 ) 
for all i~to. We claim that 92~k(5); otherwise 92~k(t~) and ~q~ is universal 
hence one of the 0~, and so T~(~ ~ 7~k) contradicting the consistency of ~ with 
T. Therefore any tuple from A satisfies in 92 some existential formula which 
implies all the universal formulas satisfied by the tuple, and so 92 is weak 
(2~,//)-atomic. 
(ii)=>(ii)*: Let 92 be ,~*-nice and let ao . . . . .  a~A.  Since 92 is also weak 
(~, H)-atomic let ~(~) be existential, imply all universal formulas atisfied by ~ in 
92, and such that 92~b(~). Assume that (92, ~)::>3(~,/~) where ~ is a model of T. 
Then ~ ~b(/~), and so bo . . . . .  b, also satisfy all the universal formulas atisfied by 
a in 92; that is, (92, t~)~(~,/~). 
The previous paragraph gives t~s what we want. First, it says that every 
existential type realized in 92 is maximal, so if 92~_~, then 92~q~(~) whenever 
~ ~(~) and ~ is existential; that is, 92 is existentially closed. Secondly, it says that 
(92, ~)--~(~,/~) iff (92, t])~(~3,/~); thus ~S*-niceness translates into ~-niceness, 
and so 92 is 2-nice. 
(ii)*=> (ii): If 92 is e.c., then for every model ~ of T, 5 from A and/~ from B, if 
(92, c~)=>a(~,/~), then (92, ~)-a(~,/~). Hence 2-niceness yields ,V*-niceness. 
Using Corollary 2.6 we see that V*-niee a.p. models are unique. 
Corollary 3.3. I f  T is an V3-theory complete for existential sentences, then T has at 
most one £*-nice a.p. model. 
Theorem 3.2(b) is exactly the kind of result that we have been after, since it 
states the equivalence of a syntactical notion of atomicity and a semantic notion of 
primeness. Combined with previous results, we see that we have complete 
analogues of Vaught's (1), (2) and (3) from the introduction for ,~*-nice a.p. 
models in ~r~ theories complete for W'-A sentences. 
The assumption that T is complete for W~I sentences is needed for the 
equivalence of Y,*-nice and countable (,~, F.)-atomic. 
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Example. There is an ~ theory complete for existential sentences which has a 
2~*-nice a.p. model which is not weak (~, ,~)-atomic. 
This is shown by Example (24. 
Both Pouzet [10, 5.2.4] and Simmons [14, 2.3] have results that imply that 
countable (~, ,~)-atomic models are e.e. and a.p. when T is an V3 theory complete 
for ~ sentences, but neither has the converse. They do not characterize their 
(syntactical) atomicity concepts "~n any (semantic) primeness terms, and they thus 
miss what we consider to be a primary goal of this work. 
A-nice a.p. models turn out to be the nicest of all. 
Theorem 3.4. Let T be an V'~ theory complete for existential sentences, and let 92 be 
a countable model of T. Then 92 is A-nice if[ 92 is (A, :£)-atomic. 
Before proving this the(~rem we define two conditions on T and prove two 
lemmas concerning them which we will also need in the next section. The 
conditions, which we think of as 'reduction' conditions,' are as follows: 
(Ro): 
(R~): 
Every existential formula complete for A formulas is complete for 
existential formulas. 
Every existential formula q~(i) consistent with T is implied by some 
A formula 0(~) consistent with T. 
Lemma 3.5. Let T be complete for existential sentences. If T has a A-nice a.p. 
model, then (R1) holds. 
Proof. Let 92 be a A-nice a.p. model of T and let ¢(~) be an existential formula 
consistent with T. Then 2[~q~(t~) for some ti in A. Let {01(.~): i~oJ} be the set of 
all A formulas satisfied by fi in 92. By A-niceness, if ~ is a model of T and 
~ 0f (6) for all i ~ ~, then (92, fi) =a (~,/~), and so 92 can be embedded in ~ with 
each a i mapped to bi. Hence ~q~(/~) since q~ is existential. Therefore, t¢ follows 
from {0i: i c ,.o} on models of T. By compactness we get a single A formula 0(~) 
satisfied by fi and such that T~(O--> q~), and so (Rt) holds. 
Lemma 3.6. (R0 implies (1~,). 
Proof. Assume (R1) and let q~(~) be existential and complete for A formulas. Let 
~b(g) be existential and assume that q~ A ~k is consistent with T. By (R1) there is a A 
formula 0(~) consistent with T such that T~ 0 ---> (q~ A ~). Then T~ (q~ ---> 0) since q~ 
is complete for A formulas and q~ A0 is consistent with T. Hence T~(q~--> ~b). 
Therefore q~ is complete for existential formulas. 
We are now ready to derive Theorem 3.4. 
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Proof of Theorem 3.4. First, assume 9/ is (A, ,~)-atomic. Then the same 'forth' 
argument used with (,Y,, ,~)-atomic models in Theorems 2.5 and 3.2 shows that 
is A-nice; one only needs a-equivalence because the formulas complete for 
existential formulas are A formulas. 
Next, assume 92 is A-nice. Then (R1) holds by Lemma 3.5 and hence also (Ro) 
by Lemma 3.6. Since 92 is, in particular, an algebraically prime model of T we 
know by Theorem 2.4 that T has a (,~, A)-atomic model. Therefore (by Theorem 
2.2) every existential formula t/,(£) consistent with T is implied by an existential 
formula q~(~) complete for a-formulas. By (Re,) ~o is in fact complete for 
existential formulas. By (R,) there is a A formula 0(4) consistent with T such that 
T~(O.---~ ). Then 0 is also complete for existential formulas and T~(O--* 4,). So 
by Theorem 2.2(i) T has a (A, ,Y,)-atomic model. By Theorem 2.7 T can have only 
one a.p. model, so the given a.p. model 92 must be (A, ,~)-atomic. 
Although a-nice a.p. models are about the strongest kind of a.p. model that 
one would generally be concerned with, there is at least one stronger kind of a.p. 
model of interest. These are what the second author introduced in [6] and called 
core models. 92 is a core model of T if 92 is a model of T and 92 is isomorphic to 
exactly one submodei of each model of T. Theorem 2.1 in [6] characterizes the 
core models of T in a way which makes it clear that they are, in particular, 
(A, 2~)-atomic (the converse fails, of course, even for complete unive:csal theories, 
see our Example D3). Using the omitting types Theorem 2.1 and [6, 2.1] we give 
the following characterization f V3 theories having a core model. 
Theorem 3.7. Let T be an V3 theory. Then the [ollowing are equivalent: 
(i) T has a core model, 
(ii) whenever ~b(x) is existential and T~3x~, then there is some existential q~(x) 
and integer k such that 
T~ 3~x~ A3x (,p A q,), 
and (#) if T~ (o7 v o'2) where o"1, o-2 are existential sentences, then T~ o'1 or T~ o-2. 
Proof. The implication (i)ff(ii) is immediate from [6, 2.1]. For the other direc- 
tion, let T* be T together with every universal sentence which is (separately) 
consistent with T. T* is consistent by (#) and complete for existential sentences. 
An application of the omitting types Theorem 2.1 yields a mod,~l in which every 
element satisfies one of the formulas ~(x) given in (ii). This modeJ is a core model 
by [6, 2.1]. 
4. Special kinds of theories 
In the preceding section we saw that two nice types of algebraically prime 
models could be syntactically characterized by certain atomicity conditions. In this 
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section we do something analogous for the existence of an a.p. mode l - - that  is, 
we restrict our attention to certain nice types of theories and characterize when 
such theories have a.p. models. 
Our first few results are implicit in the proof of Theorem 3.4. 
Theorem 4t,1. Let T be an V'3 theory complete for existential sentences, and assume 
that T satisfies (Rt). Then the following are equivalent: 
(i) T has an a.p. model, 
(ii) T hcu~ a (2~, zl )-atomic model, 
(iii) T has a (A, J~)-atomic model, 
(iv) T has a A.nice a.p. model, 
(v) T has exactly one a.p. model. 
Proof. We already know that (iii)::>(iv)::~(v)~(i)~(ii) by Theorems 3.4, 2.7 and 
2.4. blow the proof of the hard half of Theorem 3.4 shows that (ii) implies (iii) 
under the assumption of (R0, which is all we needed the A-niceness of ~ for. So 
all the conditions are equivalent. 
Condition (R~) has, perhaps, no intrinsic interest, but by Lemma 3.5 it 
necessarily holds if there is a A-nice a.p. model, and this does have intrinsic 
interest. 
Corollary 4.2. Let T be an V3 theory complete for existential sentences. Then the 
following are equivalent: 
(i) T has a a-nice a.p. model, 
(ii) T has an a.p. model and (Rt) holds. 
Note that (R0 certainly holds if T is model complete (since then every formula 
is equivalent o a A forr~lula). The reader might worry that this is forced to occur 
if T has a A-nice a.p. model, thus trivializing Theorem 4.1. Luckily this does not 
happen. 
Example. There is a complete universal theory with a A-nice a.p. model which is 
not model-complete. 
Example D3 has this property. 
We now have 0, similar result using (Ro). 
Theorem 4.3o Let T be an Y3 theory complete for existential sentences, and assume 
that T satisfies (Ro). Then the following are equivalent: 
(i) T has an a.p. model, 
(ii) T has a (E,, A )-atomic model, 
(iii) T has a (~, ,S)-atomic model, 
(iv) T has a E,*-nice a.p. model. 
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Proof. We already know that (iii)=>(iv)=),(i)=>(ii) byTheorems 3.2 and 2.4. And 
(Ro) immediately yields (ii):~(iii), so all conditions are equivalent. 
(R0) is not implied by having a (~, Z)-atomic model, however, and it is also 
incomparable with saying the only a.p. model is (~, ~)-atomic, although (Ro) 
implies that there is at most one countable (~, zl)-atomic model. 
Example. There are complete V3 theories uch that: (i) (Ro) holds but there are 
infinitely many a.p. models, (ii) (Ro) fails but there is exactly one a.p. model and it 
is (X, $)-atomic. 
Examples C2 and D1 show (i) and (ii) respectively. 
Condition (Ro) may also look very ad hoc, but in fact it holds under some very 
natural circumstances. Among them, as we will see, is the case of a universal 
theory complete for V3 sentences satisfying amalgamation. 
We fu'st introduce the following property which asserts that disjoint existentially 
defined sets (of elements in a model of T) can be separated by a A set; we refer to 
it as Existential Separation (ES). 
Property (ES). If q~(~) and ~(~) are existential formulas uch that T~"-a~ (q~ ^  if), 
then there is a A-formula 0(~) such that T~(q~ ~ O) and T~(Ik---~-nO). 
(ES) implies the amalgama,on property, and for universal theories is equivalent 
to it. In general it is equivalent to the following strong amalgamation property, 
referred to as (SA). 
Property (SA). If ~1 and f~a are models of' T and X c_ Bl f3 B2 is such that 
(~3~, a )~x ~ (~2, a)~x, 
then there is a model ~* of T and embeddings fl, f2 of ~t,  ~2 into ~* such that 
fl(a) = f2(a) for a ~ X. 
We give only a brief sketch of the proof of the theorem connecting (ES) and 
(SA), since it is only loosely connected with the main topics of this paper. All we 
use later is the consequence that a universal theory satisfying amalgamation 
satisfies [ES), although we would like the reader to realize that (ES) is a strong 
fornl of amalgamation. 
Th~arem 4.4. For any theory T, (ES) holds if] (SA) holds. 
Proof. Assume (ES) and that (~l,a)~x---a(~2, a),s×. Then in fact 
(~1, a),~x =-3(~2, a),~x and ,';0 an easy diagram argument yields a ~B* as needed 
for the conclusion of (SA). On the other hand, assume (ES) fails, so q~(~) and ~(~) 
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are existential formulas such that T~-a(tp A 0) but they are not separated by any 
A-formula. Then there are models ~,~2 of T each containing elements 
ao . . . . .  a~ such that (~,  ti)-~a (~2, ~), ~t~q~(8) and ~2i:~(a). Then no model 
~* as in the conclusion of (SA) can exist, so (SA) fails. 
Since (SA) is just ordinary amalgamation for universal theories we have as a 
consequence a syntactical characterization of the usual amalgamation property for 
universal theories, to be found in Bacsich [1]. 
Corollary 4.5. If  T is a universal theory, then (ES) holds ilY T has the amalgama- 
tion property. 
We now connect (ES) with (Ro). 
Theorem 4.6. Let T be an ~ theory complete for ~ sentences, and assume (ES) 
holds. Then (Ro) also holds. 
Proof. Let q~(:~) be existential and complete for A-formulas. We need to show 
that q~ is actually complete for existential formulas. First, let ~bl(g) and t/,2(~) both 
be existential and such that (~o A ~kl) and (q~ A ~2) are both consistent with T. We 
claim that (q~ A t~l A ~'2) is consistent with T. If not, then (ES), applied to (q~ A tkx) 
and (q~Atk2), would yield a A-formula O(~) such that T~(q~Atkl)--~O and T~ 
(q~At/,2)--*"nO. But since ~0 is complete for A formulas this contradicts the 
assumption that (~0 A tk~) and (q~ A ~2) are both consistent with T. 
It follows from what we have just shown that if 9~ is a m.odel of T, 9~q~(5) and 
~(~) is an existential formula consistent with q~, then ~t can be extended to some 
model ~[' of T with 9~'~4,(5). Repeating this process often enough and taking 
unions of chains we obtain (oince T is W~) a model ~ of T such that every/~ from 
B which satisfies ~¢(~) also satisfies every existential ~(~) consistent with qx That 
is, ~ ~ '~(~ --, ~) whenever tk is existential and consistent with q~. But these are V::I 
sentences and T is complete for ~'~ sentences, so T~VJ~ (~--* ~) for every 
existential ~ consistent with q~. Therefore q~ is complete for existential sentences, 
as desired. 
We explicitly state the following immediate consequence of Theorems 4.3 and 
4.6. 
Corollary 4.7. Let T be an ~f~ theory complete for ~ sentences satisfying (ES). 
Then the following are equivalent: 
(i) T has an a.p. model, 
(ii) T has a (~, A)-atomic model, 
(iii) T has a (~, 2~)-atomic model, 
(iv) T has a ~*-nice a.p. model. 
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Examples already cited show that the hypotheses ,~f the corollary do not 
guarantee the uniqueness of the a.p. model. 
The final special kind of theory we consider in this section is a theory with a 
countable algebraically universal model (that is, a countable model into which all 
countable models of the theory can be embedded). Here again, the motivation is 
from the elementary case, where a theory with a countable universal model has a 
prime model. Parenthetically, we note that it is known that an W~ theory has a 
countable algebraically universal (a.u.) model iff it satisfies joint embedding and 
has only countably many different maximal consistent sets of existential formulas 
([9], see also [7]). Put another way, Vaught's theorem about universal models has 
a straightforward analogue concerning algebraically universal models. 
The main result about countable a.u. models and a.p. models is the following 
theorem of Pouzet ([10, 5.4.3], see also [14]). 
Theorem 4.8. Let T be an V3 theory complete for existential sentences, and assume 
that T has a countable a.u. model. Then T has a weak (2~, II)-atomic model. 
Proof. Let T* be the maximal consistent ~ extension of T. Then T* is complete 
for V3 sentences and still has z countable a.u. model. We will show that T* has a 
(~, ~)-atomic model, which yields the conclusion by Theorem 1.4. 
Since T* has a countable a.u. model there are only countably many maximal 
consistent sets of existential ~ormulas. It also follows that T* has a model 91 every 
tuple of which realizes one of these countably many maximal existential types. If 
the existential formula q~(~) is in only one such maximal set, then 9~V~ (q~ ~ ~) 
whenever ~ is in the set; since T* is complete for V] sentences it follows that 
T* ~V~ (¢ ~ ~). Hence any such q~ is complete for existential formulas. 
We will show that any consistent existential ~(~) is consistent with (and hence 
implied by) some q~(~) which belongs to just one maximal existential type; this 
will yield a (2L ~)-atomic model of T* by Theorem 2.2(iii). If Ik(g) were not 
consistent with any such ¢(~), then any existential formula consisteat with qJ 
would have to belong to two different such maximal sets. A standard splitting 
argument yields 2 ~' pairwise incompatible consistent sets of existential formulas, 
contradicting the existence of a countable a.u. model. 
We know that a countable weak (,~,//)-atomic model need not be a.p., and the 
same example shows that we cannot conclude in Theorem 4.8 that T has an a.p. 
model. 
Example. There is an V3 theory complete 
countable a.u. model but with no a.p. model. 
This is shown by Example B1. 
for existential sentences with a 
Using Theorem 2.4 and 4.3 we can identify two situations in which we obtain a 
(~, ,~)-atomic model assuming a countable a.u. model. 
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Corollary 4.9. Let T be an Y3 theory having a countable ,~.u. model. Then T has a 
(~, ~,)-atomic model provided either O) T is complete for ~ sentences, o~ (ii) T is 
complete for existential sentences and (Ro) holds. 
It would be appropriate at this point to prove the existence of models a.p. over 
sets from the assumption that there are only countably many maximal existential 
types over a countable set (that is, a stability assumption, which is stronger than 
the existence of a countable a.u. model). Unfortunately, as we leave the reader to 
check, this does not work out. The models naturally obtained this way are only 
a.p. (over a set) among the e.c. models. We therefore do not pursue this line, 
particularly since it has been very fully developed by Shelah [12]. Other results on 
models a.p. over sets can be found in Forrest [3]. 
$. Universal theories 
This section could be considered as a continuation of the preced~ing one, since 
we will look at a restricted class of theories, the universal theories, and see that 
some of our previous results can be improved in this case. 
The first result is an obvious remark which shows that the study of algebraically 
prime models trivializes if we are in a language with individual constants. 
Theorem 5.1. Let T be a universal theory in a language with individual constants. 
Then T has an a.p. model if[ T is complete for open sentences. Any a.p. model mus~ 
be generated by the constants, hence T has at most one a.p. model. 
Proof, Clearly, if 9~ is a model of T, then the submode~ 9.1o f 9~ generated by ~he 
constants is a model of T and contains no other model of T. So T has an a.p. 
model iff 9.Io is a.p.; and this can happen iff the submodels generated by the 
constants in any two models are isomorphic, which happens precisely if T is 
complete for open sentences. 
More generally, if some term is provably constant in T, then we could add an 
individual constant set equal to the value of this term and obtain a universal 
theory to which Theorem 5.1 applies. We will not pursue this, since our interest is 
in the more general situation where there may be no such terms. 
To help specialize our earlier results to universal theories it is useful to recall 
the following well-known fact. 
Lemma 5.2. Let T be universal, and let O(Xo . . . . .  x,) be a A formula. Then there is 
an open formula a(Xo . . . . .  x~) such that 
T~ ( O "~ ct ). 
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Note that the open formula has no more free variables than the a formula we 
start with; also we are. not asserting this for sentences 0, for which the lemma fails. 
We are now able t3 characterize the universal theories complete for existential 
sentences ha-ving a.p. models. Of course Thv(~D is not usually complete for 
existential sentences (unlike Thva(~)), but it is contained in a unique universal 
extension which is complete for existential sentences, if it has an a.p. model. 
Theorem 5.3. Let T be a universal theory complete for existential sentences. Then 
the following are equivalent: 
(i) T has ,~n a.p. model, 
(ii) T has a (2£, A)-atomic model, 
(iii) There is some existential formula q)(x) complete for open formulas. 
Proof. We know (i)~(ii) by Theorem 2.4, and (ii)=>(iii) is obvious from Lemma 
5.2 and the definitions. So, assuming (iii) we show (i). Let 92 be any model of 7". 
Since T is complete for existential sentences, ~q~(ao) for some ao. Let 92o be the 
submodei of 92 generated by ao; then ever,,, element of Ao has the form t-(a0) for 
terms ~'(x). We claim that 9~o is is a.p. To see this, let ~ be any model of T, and 
say that ~ ~ q~(bo). Then the map sending ~'(ao) to *(bo) defines an isomorphism of 
9~ o into ~ since q~ is complete for open formulas. Thus (i) holds. 
Note that we are not asserting that 2log ¢(a0) in the above proof, so we have 
not shown that T has a (2, A)-atomic algebraically prime model. We do not know, 
even for universal theories complete for V3 sentences, if T must have a (~, a)- 
atomic a.p. model provided it has any a.p. model. This would follow from a 
positive answer to the following question. 
Question. If T is a universal theory complete for existential sentences having an 
a.p. model, must there be some open formula tC(xo . . . . .  x,) complete for open 
formulas? 
This qaestion does not ask whether T has a (za, A)-atomic model, which we 
know to be false. 
Examples. There are complete universally axiomatized theories (a) with no a.p. 
models, and (b) with infinitely many a.p. models, exactly one of which is weak 
(~, ,~)-atomic, and no (Z, ~)-atomic and no (a, A)-atomic models; the other a.p. 
models are not ~,-nice. 
Examples B2 and CI,  respectively, suffice. 
A considerable simplification of the proof of Theorem 4.8 shows that ot:r 
question above has a positive answer if T has a countable a.u. model (which is, of 
course, not necessary for 7' to have an a.p. model as Example C1 shows). We thus 
have the following result. 
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Corol~ry 5.4. Let T be a universal theory complete for existential sentences having 
a countable algebraically universal model. Then T has an a.p. model which is 
( ~, A )-atomic. 
Proof. Every open formula consistent with T must be implied by an open formula 
complete for open formulas; otherwise the standard splitting argument would 
yield 2 ~ pairwise incompatible sets of open formulas, contradicting the existence 
of a countable a.u. model. If q~(x) is an open formula complete for open formulas, 
~[~q~(ao), and ~o is the submodel of 92 generated by ao, then 920 is a.p. (by the 
proof of Theorem 5.3) and is easily seen to be (~, A)-atomic. 
We now look at some of the stronger kinds of algebraically prime and atomic 
models, and will connect them up with minimal models. 
Delinition. 9.I is a minimal model of T if 92 is a model of T and no proper 
substructure of 92 is a model of T. 
As pointed out by Theorem 5.1, if a universal theory in a language with 
individual constants has an a.p. model it has one which is minimal. Clearly having 
a minimal a.p. model implies there is only one a.p. model. If T is universal then a 
minimal model of T has no proper submodels at all, but we will see that this does 
not imply that there are any constant erms in the language. The next .'heorem 
says that the minimal a.p. models are precisely the countable (A, 2)-atomic 
models. 
Theorem 5.$. Let T be a universal theory complete for existential sentences. Then 
the following are equivalent: 
(i) T has a minimal a.p. model, 
(ii) T has a (a, ,Y)-atomic model, 
(iii) T has exactly one a.p. model and it is (~, ~)-atomic, 
(iv~ There is some open formula a(x) complete for existential formulas. 
Proof, (i)~(ii): Let 9.I be a minimal a.p. model of T. We will show (R1) holds, 
which will then yield (ii) by Theorem 4.1. Let q~(i) be existential and consistent 
with T, say q~ is 3~ct*(~, ~) where cz* is open. Then 9293£q~, hence 92Va*(t~,/~) for 
some ti, b" in 92. Since 92 is minimal, t~ = ao . . . . .  an generate all of A, hence each 
bj =,i(t~) for some term ~,i. Let a(~) result from a* by replacing y~ by 1-j(£) 
throughout. Then 92Vc~(t~), T~ce --~ ~, and tz is open. Thus (Rt) holds. 
(ii)~(iii): Immediate from Theorems 2.4 and 2.7. 
(iii) :~ (iv): Let 92 be a.p., ao ~ A, and 920 be the submodel generated by ao. Then 
92o is a.p., hence by (iii) must be (,~, ,~)-atomic. Therefore there is some existential 
q~(x) complete for existential formulas such that 92ogq~(ao). Just as in the proof of 
(i)~(ii) we get an open t~(x) such that 92o~a(ao) and T~(ol --> ¢); in particular a 
is complete for existential formulas since ~ is. 
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(iv)=>(i): Let a(x)  be open and complete for existential formulas. Let ~I, be any 
model of T, 9 . I~a(a) ,  and let 9.1 be the submodel of ~ ,  generated by a. Then, as 
in Theorem 5.3 9~ is a.p. 
Let ~ c_ 9~. We will show ~ = 9~, thus yielding (i), by showing that a e B. 
First, 9.1~a(a) since a is open. Therefore f3~a(bo) for some bocB, since T is 
complete for existential sentences. Then bo=r(a)  for some term ~" since a 
generates 9.1. 
So, a(X)A3y (a (y )Ax  = "r(y)) is consistent with T, since it is satisfied by x = bo 
in 9.1. Since a is complete for existential formulas we must actually have 
T~a(x) ~ ::ly (a (y )Ax  = ~'(y)). 
In particular, applied to x = a in ~ we find there is some at ~ A such that 
9~ ~ a (a , )  A a = ~(a0 .  
Now, a, = "G(a) for some term ~',. Thus 
a(x)^ T l ( r (x ) )  = x 
is consistent with T, since it is satisfied by x = al  in 9.1. Once again, since a is 
complete for existential formulas, we have 
T~a(x)--* T I (T (X) )  : X. 
Now apply this when x = a, and we see that ,G(~,(a))= a. But "r(a)= b, so 
~',(b) = a. Therefore a ~ B and we are done. 
There is a very natural improvement to Theorem 5.5 that we do not know if we 
can make. 
Question. If T is a universal theory complete for existential sentences with 
exactly one a.p. model must this a.p. model be minimal? 
Of course, if (R0) holds, then (iv) of Theorem 5.5 follows just from the 
assumption of an open formula complete for open formulas, by Lemma 5.2. Using 
Corollary 4.5 and Theorem 4.6 we see we have the following sufficient condition 
for the existence of a minimal a.p. model. 
Corollary 5.6. Let T be a universal theory complete for W~ sentences and satisfying 
amalgamation. Assume there is some open formula a(x) complete for open for- 
mulas. Then T has a minimal a.p. model. 
The assumption of the existence of an open formula complete for open 
formulas follows (as we showed in proving Corollary 5.4) from the existence of a 
countable a.u. model, th'as producing a completely semantic result from Corollary 
5.6. 
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Question. Can the assumption that there is an open formula complete for open 
formulas in Corollary 5.6 be replaced by the assumption that T has an a.p. 
model? 
One might wonder whether the existence of a minimal a.p. model is so 
restrictive that the only universal theories having one have individual constants 
(and so are covered by Theorem 5.1) or are at least model-complete. Luckily this 
does not happen. 
~,~xample. There is a complete universal theory with a minimal a.p. model which 
is not model-complete, has no constant terms, and has no core model. 
This is shown by Erample D3. 
In this connectic,~, notice that a (A, $)-atomic model of an W~ theory (even if 
complete) need not be minimal (Example D4, for example). 
We have various examples of V'~ theories with infinitely many countable 
models, all a.p. We do not know if this can occur with universal theories. In fact, 
we do not know the answer to: 
Question. Is there a universal theory with no finite models and complete for 
existential sentences all of whose countable models are a.p.? 
We have also a miscellaneous result which concerns having a (A, A)-atomic 
model. 
Theorem 5,7, Let T be a universal theory complete for existential sentences. Then T 
has a (A, A)-atomic model i f /T  has an a.p. model and all finitely generated a.p. 
models of T are (2~, A)-atomic. 
Proof. If T has a (A, A)-atomic model, then it has an a.p. model by Theorem 5.3 
and all a.p. models of T are (A, A)-atomic by Theorem 1.6, thus in particular all 
finitely generated a.p. models are (~, A)-atomic. 
Conversely, assume all finitely generated a.p. models of T are (,~, // )-atomic. 
Let 92 be an a.p. model of T. W3 will show 92 is (A, A)-atomic. Let ao . . . . .  an cA  
and let 920 be the submodel they generate. Then 920 is also a.p., hence must be 
(,~, A)-atomic by assumption. Therefore there is some existential ¢(x0 . . . . .  x,) 
such that 92o~(fi) and ~ is complete for A formulas. As in the proof of Theorem 
5.5 we find an open a(~) such that 92o~(a) and T~(ct--7¢). So a is also 
complete for A formulas, and 92~a(a) since a is open. Hence 92 is (A, A)-atomic. 
L~ the remainder of this section we discuss what happens if :r is not complete 
for existential sentences. We will see that there are considerable obstacles to 
extending our results m such theories, even if they are universal. 
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We first note that from Theorem 5.1 we do get a characterization of the 
universal *henries with a.p. models, but it is not satisfactory as we will explain 
below. 
Corollary 5.8. Let T be a universal theory. Then the following are equivalent: 
(i) T has an a.p. model, 
(ii) T can be expanded to a unioersal theory T* in a language adding one 
individual constant such that 
(a) every model of T can be expanded to a model of T*, and 
(b) T* is complete for open sentences. 
Proof. (i)~(ii): Let ~ be a.p, let annA and let 
T* = Tt3{a(c): ~a(ao) ,  a(x) is open}. 
Then T* is universal and complete for open sentences, and since ~2t is a.p. every 
model of T can be expanded to a model of T*. 
(iii)~(i): By Theorem 5.1, T* has an a.p. model 9~* Since every model of T can 
be expanded to a model of T* it follows that 9~, the reduct of 9~* to the original 
language, is an a.p. model of T. 
The reason this result is totally unsatisfactory is that condition (ii) is fully as 
complicated as condition (i) which it should explicate. Condition (ii) does not give 
us any information about any a.p. model (like niceness or atomicity) nor dc,es it 
give us any real information about the theory. That is, although technically we 
have a characterization f universal theories with an a.p. model the characteriza- 
tion is unenlightening. 
Some of these objections would be overcome if T* could be taken as a finite 
extension of T; in pa:'ticular (b), the most offensive part of (ii), could be replaced 
by the syntactical statement T~3xO(x) where O(c) is the conjunction of the 
sentences in T* - T. Unfortunately this improvement cannot be made, as is shown 
by Example A1. 
We now turn to examples howing the failure of some reasonable ways to try to 
fix up Theorem 5.3 so as to work for universal theories not complete for 
existential sentences. 
First note that if T has an a.p. model, then, although it need not be complete 
for existential sentences, it must satisfy the following weaker condition: 
If T~q~lvq~ where q~ and q~2 are existential sentences, then T~q~l (#) 
or T~q~z. 
We next note that we can prove (i)~(iii) of Theorem 5.3 when T is universal 
without assuming that T is complete for existential sentences (take a maximal 
A-type in an a.p. model and apply Theorem 2.1; the one direction of Theorem 
2.1 needed does not requireT to be complete for existential formulas, see Keisler 
[4]). 
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Our first attempt o fix up Theorem 5.3, then, is as follows: 
(1) If T is universal and satisfies (#), then (i)¢~(iii). Unfortunately, this is false 
as is shown by Example A2. 
The reason that the implication (iii)~(i) requires T to be complete for 
existential sentences i  that the formula q~(x) in (iii) may be consistent with T 
while 3x~(x) is not true on all models of T. So let (iii)* be (iii) with the added 
requirement that T~x~(x) .  Then (iii)* => (i), and one might hope for: 
(2) If T is universal and satisfies (#), then (i)¢~ (iii)*. Unfortunately, this is also 
false, as is shown by Example A1. 
Finally note that if T satisfies (#), then T has a unique extension to a universal 
theory T* (in the same language) which is complete for existential sentences; 
further, any a.p. model of T is also a model of T*, and hence is an a.p. model of 
T*. One's final hope for a theorem would then be: 
(3) If T is universal and satisfies (#), then T has an a.p. model iff T* has an 
a.p. model. But this is false too, as is shown by Example A2. 
We are thus led to conclude that the prospects of finding acceptable results on 
a.p. models if T is not complete for existential sentences are extremely slim. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we have introduced ten different kinds of models besides the 
algebraically prime models that form the basis of our work. Their relations and 
connections with each other in V3 theories complete for existential sentences (or, 
sometimes, for V3 sentences) are the main subject of Sections 1-3, and a 
reasonably complete picture has emerged. 
The relationships between the eleven types of models are summarized in Fig. 1. 
A solid arrow means that, for V:I theories complete for existential sentences, a 
countable model with the first property has the second. A dotted arrow means the 
implication holds for V3 theories complete for V3 sentences. The diagram is 
complete since we have examples howing that no solid or dotted arrows hold 
other than those implied by what is in the diagram. 
Remember that our stated goal was to develop results parallel to Vaught's 
(1)-(3) in Section 0, that is, to establish equivalences between (semantic) algebraic 
primeness notions and syntactic (primarily atomicity) notions. In this concluding 
section we review the main positive accomplishments of this type, and mention 
the main open questions. 
In Section 3 we saw that results parallel to Vaught's could be obtained for two 
nice kinds of a.p. models. 
(A) A-nice a.p. models. 
If T is an V3 theory complete for existential sentences, then we can parallel 
Vaught's (1)-(3) as follows: 
(1) A countable model of T is a A-nice a.p. model iff it is (A, ~)-atomic 
(Theorem 3.4); 
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(2) Such T's having a A-nice a.p. model are syntactically characterized 
(Theorems 2.2, 3.4); 
(3) I '  can have at most one A-nice a.p. model, in fact only one a.p. model if it 
has a A-nice a.p. model (Theorem 2.7). 
A model which is A-nice is also ,~*-oJce, but not conversely. This weaker kind 
of model also has a sa~:isfactory theory. 
(B) E*-nice a.p. models. 
If T is an V3 theory complete for V3 sentences, then we have the following: 
(1) A countable model of T is a ,~*-nice a.p. model iff it is (,~, .~)-atomic 
(Theorem 3.2); 
(2) Such T's having a E*-nice a.p. model are syntactically characterized 
(Theorems 2.2, 3.2); 
(3) T can have at most one ,~*-nice a.p. model (Corollary 3.3). 
In addition one further result of Vaught's generalizes to these a.p. models of 
such theories: 
(4) If T has a countable a.u. r,aodel, then T has a E*-nice a.p. model. 
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In Sections 4 and 5 we saw that by putting further natural restrictions on T we 
could characterize having an a.p. model. 
(C) Restrictions on T. 
(1) If T is an ~ theory complete for ¥=! sentences and in addition T satisfies 
(SA), then T has an a.p. model iff T has a (~, ~)-atomic model (Corollary 4.7); 
(2) If T is a universal theory complete for existential sentences, then T has an 
a.p. model iff T has a (~, zt)-atomic model (Theorem 5.3). 
However, without strengthening the kind of a.p. model one looks at or 
restricting the theories considered further than just W~ theories complete for V3 
sentences, we do not have results of the desired sort (although we have counter- 
examples to various plausible conjectures). 
We know, for V=! theories T complete for existential sentences, that the 
existence of an a.p. model of T is not equivalent to the existence of any of our 
atomic models. There is the possibility left open that if T is complete for ~'] 
sentences, then T has an a.p. model iff T has a weak (,~, ~)-atomic model. A 
positive answer to this would undoubtedly be very nice (although apparently it
would not yield a syntactical condition equivalent to having an a.p. model). We 
suspect he answer is negative, however. 
Vaguely put, our main open question is: just how complicated is the condition 
that a theory T has an a.p. model (where T is ~ and complete for existential, or 
even ~,  sentences)? Is it equivalent to the existence of a model with better 
properties than just being a.p.? Is it even an absolute property of T or not? 
Specifically, we have the following question: if T (~¢'~ and complete for 
existential sentences) has an a.p. model must it have a Z-nice a.p. model? Notice 
that the property of T of having a £-nice a.p. model is absolute (by Shoenfield's 
absoluteness theorem [13]). Hence a positive answer to this question would also 
show that having an a.p. model is an absolute property of T (when T is V3 and 
complete for existential sentences). Of course, simply knowing that having an a.p. 
model is absolute would not give us anything; to say that 9A is an a.p. model of T 
with domain (o is absolute by [13], but this tells us nothing about what it means to 
be an a.p. model. 
At the other extreme, if one could show that having an a.p. model is not an 
absolute property of T, this would be the strongest indication of the extreme 
intractibility of this notion. 
7. Examples 
In this section we present all the examples that we have referred to throughout 
the paper. Due to the importance of these examples for the results of this paper 
we have tried to present hem in sufficient detail, and with enough argument on 
the main points, that the reader will be able to complete the verifications that the 
theories have the desired properties with a minimum of ingenuity. Nevertheless, 
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many points are just sketched lightly in order to keep the length of this section 
within reasonable bounds. 
All of the theories are given by specifying the axioms, so it is clear the theories 
are all V3. This means, however, that some work must be done to show that 
certain of the theories are complete. We always do this by showing (in outline) 
that any two ~o-saturated models of T are L=,o-elementarily equivalent. This 
condition is neces~ry and sufficient for a theory to be complete (since every 
model is elementarily equivalent o an to-saturated model, and elementarily 
equivalent to-saturated models ale L=~-elementarily equivalent), and provides a 
very neat and efficient way of verifying that a considerable number of theories are 
complete. In these verifications we always suppress the compactness argument 
needed to show that all to-saturated models have the properties we claim. 
The examples are divided into the following five groups, according to the 
dominant feature illustrated. Except in the first group all theories are V-d theories 
complete for existential sentences, o this is normally omitted from the descrip- 
tion. 
A. Universal theories not complete for existential sentences. 
B. Theories with no algebraically prime models. 
C. Theories with many algebraically prime models. 
D. Theories with exactly one algebraically prime model. 
E. Theories with prescribed numbers of algebraically prime models. 
Example A1. A theory wi'k exactly one a.p. model, but there is no existential 
formula complete for open formulas which is satisfied in all models of the theory. 
The language has just two ~mary functions s and h. 92 is the model whose 
universe consists of two copies of the integers, say A ={n: n e2v}O{n*: n~Z}; s 
is immediate successor on each copy of 7/, so s(n)= n + 1 and s(n*)= (n + 1)*; 
h(0) = 0* and h(0*)= 0 but h(a)= a for all a other than 0, 0". The theory T 
consists of all universal sentences true on 92. 
Le~ 920 be the submodel of 9~ generated by 1; that is, Ao={n~Z: n~>l} and 
h(a) , -a for all a e A,,. Then 920 is an a.p. model of T. The formula h(x)~ x is 
complete for open formulas (since it is true on all models of T that h(x)# x 
implies h(s" (x))= s" (x) for all n > 0). But no existential formula tp(x) satisfied on 
920 can imply that h(s'~(x)) = s"(x) for all n > 0; this is true because any existential 
co(x) satisfied in 920 will be satisfied in 92 by some n<0 (take n sufficiently 
negative, depending on ~o(x)), and for such an n some s-power will be moved by 
h. 
Example A2,. A theory with no a.p. models, even though (#) holds and there is 
an open formula complete for open formulas (hence a (£, A)-atomic model); and 
in fact the maximal universal extension of this theory has exactly one a.p. model. 
Algebraically prime models 323 
The language has three unary functions, s, p and h. 2[ is the same model as in 
Example A1 in which we define p as immediate predecessor n each copy of 7], so 
p(n) = n - 1 and p(n*) = (n - 1)*. T consists of all universal sentences true on ~t. 
Then it is still true that h(x) ~ x is not satisfied on all models of T, so let 2[0 be a 
1-generated model of T satisfying Vx (h(x)= x). Then no model of T can be 
embedded in both 2[ and 2[o (since they are both minimal), hence T has no a.p. 
models. 
But the formula h(x) ~ x is still complete for open formulas, and condition (#) 
of Section 5 holds. This is true because 2[0 can be embedded in every model of T 
other than 2[ (including an elementary extension of 2[); therefore T~tr iff 2[0~cr 
for every existential sentence tr. 
It follows from this that TU{Vx (h(x)= x)} is complete for existential sentences 
and 9Ao is the unique a.p. model of TU{Vx (h(x)=x)}. 
Example B1. An W~ theory complete for existential sentences with a countable 
a.u. model and also a weak (A, //)-atomic model, but no a.p. model. 
The language has just a binary relation symbol < .  T says just that < is a linear 
order (of the universe) and there are infinitely many different elements. Then, as 
is well known, T is complete for existential sentences; in fact one can verify that 
T = Thva((to + to*, < )). T has no a.p. model, since no infinite linear order can be 
embedded in both (to, <)  and (to*, <).  But (Q, <)  is a countable a.u. model of T, 
and it is even weak (/~,//)-atomic, since it is (za, ~)-atomic w.r.t. Thv~((~, <)), 
which is the maximal consistent V"-A extension of T. 
Example B2. A complete V::l theory T with no (E, za)-atomic model although 
there is a theory To ~ T complete for existential sentences which does have an a.p. 
model. 
The language has just two functions, f and g. The axioms of T say that f 
and g are 1-1, f " (x )# x and g"(x)# x for all n > 0, f and g have disjoint ranges, 
and Yx 3y (f(y) = x v g(y) = x), that is, everything is in the range of either f or g. 
Thus, the smallest model of T containing an element ao is a full binary tree 
through ao in which f and g are the immediate successor functions and which has 
no first element. Such a model is minimal and called a 'component'. Every model 
of T consists of some number of disjoint components. There are 2 ~ non- 
isomorphic components, none of which can be embedded in the other; f¢:r 
example there is a component realizing the type 
{]y (x = f(y)), ::ly (x = f2(y)), ]y  (x = f3(y)) . . . .  } 
and another ealizing the type obtained by replacing ' f '  throughout by 'g'. Since 
no model of T can be embedded in both of these, T has no a.p. model. 
Clearly any to-saturated model of T must contain infinitely many copies of each 
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component, Thus any two to-saturated models of T are L~,-elementarily equival- 
ent and sc T is complete. 
Now, let To be the subtheory of T obtained by throwing away the last axiom 
which says that everything is in the range of either f or g, Then To has a unique 
1-generated model 920, which is obviously a.p. for To. One can also easily see that 
To = Thw(92o). 
If desired T could be made universal by adding a function p for immediate 
predecessor; then of course no such subtheomy To exists. 
The theory T of this example is due to Ehrenfeucht and Fuhrken [2], 
E~smlple 113. An V3 theory T complete for V3 sentences with no a.p. model, but 
with a (zi, A)-atomic model and also with the property that every consistent 
existential formula is implied by a consistent existential ~(£) such that 
{universal 0(~): (0A0) is consistent with T)U {0(g)} 
is consistent with T. 
The language has unary functions f, for n E to and a binary predicate <. 
We first define the theory To which says that < is a tree order without first 
element in which the f,'s are immediate successor functions; that is, the axioms 
say that the f,'s are 1-1 and have disjoint ranges, f~(x)~ x for all k > 0, < is a 
partial order, x<f,(x)  and Vu-n(x<u<f,(x)) ,  and: 
x <zAy<z- -> x<yvx  = yvy<x,  
Vx Vy3z (z <xAz <y). 
Then To can easily be shown to be complete for existential sentences (but not 
for V3 sentences). ~/o therefore has a unique maximal consistent ~ extension T, 
which is complete for V3 sentences. 
A model 92 of To is called minimal if 
921:Vx Vy (x < y---~ V {Y = ~'(x): terms ~'(x)}). 
Note that a minimal model of To has no proper submodels which are models of 
To, and conversely. Since we do not have the axioms of T given explicitly, it is not 
immediately obvious if any of these minimal models are actually models of T. 
(1). T has a minimal model. 
Otherwise by the omitting types Theorem 2.1 there is an existential formula 
q~(x, y) consistent with T such that 
T~Vx Vy (q~(x, y) --~ x < y/x y =p "r(x)) 
for all terms l-(x) But these sentences are universal, hence true on all models of 
To since To is complete for existential sentences; further To~3X 3yq~ for the same 
reason; and these contradict the fact that To certainly has minimal models. 
If 92o is a minimal model of To then by a near-minimal extension of 92o is meant 
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a model 921 of To such that ~o~921 and such that A1-Ao={,r(a): terms -r(x)} 
where a is a new immediate successor of some point aoeAo (i.e., ao<a but 
-lf,(ao)<~a for all n). 
(2) If 92o is a minimal model of To and 921 is a near-minimal extension of 92o, 
then 91o< 911. 
Let Lo be any finite sublanguage of L and let al . . . . .  a~ a Ao. Then the reduct 
of 92o to Lo is isomorphic to the reduct of 911 to Lo via an isomorphism fixing 
al . . . . .  a~, thus showing (2). Note that instead of adding one new immediate 
successor of some ape Ao we could add any number of new (incomparable) 
immediate successors, close under the terms, and still have an elementary 
extension. 
The next fact will give us most of what we need. 
(3) Let ~, ~ be models of T and let a e A, b e B. Then there are models 911, ~1 
of T, containing a, b respectively, such that (911, a )~(~l ,  b), 
(91,, a)~3(92, a), (~1, b )~(~,  b). 
First, by (1 let 9~ o be some minimal model of T and let ao~Ao. By compact- 
ness 9.1 has m elementary extension 91' such that 92oc_~' and ao<a but 
~([~(ao)~a) ior all n. Now let 921 be the ~,ubmodel of 91' generated by ~o and a. 
Then 911 is a near-minimal extension of 92o i~: which the elements less than a are 
precisely the elements ~<ao. Since 91o is given as a model of T we know ,01  is a 
model of T by (2), and obviously (gAa, a)#~(92, a). The same process applied to 
(~, b) using the same (92o, ao) yields ~,  a near-minimal extension of 91o in which 
the elements <b are precisely the elements <~ao. Therefore (911, a)~(~1,  b), and 
we have established (3). 
We will use (3) in the following reformulation: 
(3') For any models 91, ~ of T and any a ~ A, b ~ B 
(universal 0(x): 92~ 0(a)} U {universal 0(x): ~9~ 0(b)} 
is consistent with T. 
Finally, consider formulas ~(Xo . . . .  , x~) of the form 3u/~ (x~ = ~'~(u)) for terms 
~'o(u) . . . . .  ~(u).  Every tuple in any minimal model of T satisfies ome such ~(~), 
and every existential ¢(~) consistent with T is implied by some such t0(~). We 
show that any such ~0 has the property demanded in the description of Example 
B3 ~ this will then show the last assertion of Example B3 and also that every 
minimal model of T is (~, A)-atomic. So, let 01(~) and 02(~) be universal formulas 
separately consistent with t~(~); let Of(u) be O~O'o(U) . . . . .  -r~(u)). Then O's(u) and 
O~(u) are each consistent with T, so by (3') 0~^ 0~ is consistent with T; and this 
means that 01 ^  02^ ~ is consistent with T. This shows 0 is as desired. 
In fact the minimal models o~ T are (zl, zl)-atomic (e.g., -n(x < y v x = y v y < x) 
is complete for A-formulas, as is shown by using the comment at the end of the 
proof of (2) to derive a generalization of (3)). Of course, T has no a.p. models 
(just as in Example B2). 
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Example C1. A complete universal theory with infinitely many a.p, models, none 
of which is (.F, .F)-atomic, exactly one is weak (Y., .~)-atomic, and the others are 
not .~-nice and not (.~, A)-atomic. 
The language consists of infinitely many unary functions f,, n ~ to. The axioms of 
T say that the / , ' s  are 1- l ,  have disjoint ranges, and fk,(x)~ x for all k > 0 (recall 
Examples B2 and B3). Thug T is a universal theory, and a 1-generated model of 
T is an infinite branching tree with root (the generator) in which the f, 's are the 
immediate successor functions. 
By a component of a model of T we mean a maximal 'connected' subset, i.e., a 
maximal piece such that for any a~, az in the set there is some b and terms ~'~, ~'2 
such that a~ =~-~(b) fo~ i=1,2 .  There is exactly one component with a first 
element (namely the 1-generated model), but there are 2 °" non-isomorphic 
components with no first element (see Example B2). An to-saturated model of T 
has infinitely many copies of each component with no first element, so T is 
complete. 
For each n, 1 ~n ~<to, let 9/~ be the model of T with exactly n (disjoint) 
components, each with a first element. Then each 9/, is a.p. (9/,~ can be embedded 
in 9/~, for example, by mapping the different roots in 9.Io, to the different level-1 
points in 9/~), and clearly T has no other a.p. models. 
No 9/, is (X,X)-atomic (since no formula can imply all the formulas 
-n3y (f , (y)= x), n ~ to. which are satisfied by a root). 9/1 can be shown to be weak 
(~, ~)-atomic, but 9/, for n >12 is not (~, A)-atomic and not ~-n ice~to  verify 
this last assertion, let a~ be the root of 9/~ and let a, be one of the roots of 9/~ 
(n >I 2); then (gd,,, a,)~a(9/~, a~) but clearly this does not extend to an embedding. 
Example C2. A complete V3 theory with infinitely many countable models, all of 
which are Z-nice a.p. models, exactly one of which is weak (~, ~)-atomic, and it is 
also (X, X)-atomic; the others are not even (~, A)-atomic; (ES) and hence (Ro) 
hold; note also that the countable (X, 2)-atomic model is a~u. 
The language has a binary relation E and infinitely many individual constants 
c., n ~ to. T says that E is an equivalence relation (on the universe), c. ~: cm if 
n :/: m, every equivalence class has at most two elements, each c. is equivalent 
only to itself, and there are infinitely many two-element equivalence classes. The 
countable models of T are precisely the models 9/. for 0~ < n ~<¢o, where 9/. has 
exactly n one-element equivalence classes other than those given by the con- 
stants. T is complete since any to-saturated model of T must have infinitely many 
one-element equivalence classes not containing a constant. 
Clearly every countable model of T is a.p. 9/,0 is (.Y,, ~)-atomic; the existential 
formulas of one variable complete for existential formulas are x =c .  and 
3y (x~yAE(x ,  y)). None of the other models is even (~, zt)-atomic (since no 
single formula can imply x ~ c,, for all n ~ to unless it implies ::ly (x# y ^  E(x, y)), 
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but they are all ~-nice (since an embedding can safely take a non-constant with a 
one-element equivalence class to a point in a two-element equivalence class). (ES) 
is easily verified. 
Example C3. A complete W~ theory with infinitely many countable models, all of 
which are weak (,~, ~)-atomic and one of which is (~, ~)-atomic; (Ro) fails; 
remark that the countable (~, 2~)-atomic model is a.u. 
The language has just a binary relation E. T is a theory whose models are 
graphs, that is the elements of a model are vertices and E(x, y) means that x and 
y are connected by an edge. T further says that the graph is undirected (that is~ 
E(x, y) --~ E(y, x)), there are no loops (that is, no E-path of at least three distinct 
points can lead from x back to x, and also ~E(x, x)), and every point is joined by 
an edge to infinitely many other points. Clearly T is W-A. 
By a component of a model of T we mean a maximal connected subset (so, all 
the points from which an E-path leads to some one point a). Any two countable 
components axe isomorphic, and the countable models of T are precisely the 
models 92,, 1~ n ~<~o, wi.th n components. T is complete since any ~o-saturated 
model of T must have infinitely many components. 
All countable models of T are a.p. 92~ clearly is, and the submodel of 921 
obtained by deleting one point is isomorphic to 92,o (since the infinitely many 
points joined by an edge to the deleted point are now in different components), so 
92t contains copies of every 92,. 
92~ is (,~,2~)-atomic (e.g., the existential formula saying that x and y are 
connected by a path of r~ distinct elements is complete for existential formulas). 
The other 92.'s are weak (~, ,~)-atomic (e.g., the formula ~E(x, y)/xx# y implies 
all the existential formulas satisfied by points x, y in different components). 
Example C4o ~n W~ theory complete for existential sentences with infinitely 
many a.p. models, all ,~-nice, exactly one of which is ~*-nice hut none are weak 
(,~, ~)-atomic; we may take the theory to be Thva(~D where 92 is a.p. 
We first describe a preliminary theory To which has all the desh'ed properties 
except the last, The language has just a binary relation E. To says that E is an 
equivalence relation (on the universe) with infinitely many equivalence classes, 
and at most one equivalence class is finite; this last condition is expressed by the 
infinite collection of sentences saying that if the equivalence class of x has at most 
n elements and if -~E(x, y), then the equivalence class of y has more than n 
elements, for each n. 
To is then an ~ theory whose countable models are just the models 92, with 
one n-element equivalence class, 1 ~ n < to, and 92o with no fiuite equivalence 
class. All of these countable models are deafly a.p., even 2~-nice a.p. (hence To is 
complete for existential sentences). 92o is ~*-nice, since if (92o, t~)~3(~,/~) where 
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is a model of To, then (~o, a)ma(~, b) since no b~ (in/~) can belong to a finite 
equivalence class. 
But no model of To is weak (~, .~)-atomic since we claim that no existential 
c¢(x) consistent with To can imply that the equivalence class of x has more than n 
elements for every n. Our claim holds since if 9~q~(a), then ~*~o(a)  for some 
finite ~*_c9~ (not a model of To); then (~1", a) can be embedded in (9~., a~) for 
some n > 0, where a~ is in the equivalence class with n elements, hence ~.  
~(o~). 
To has all the properties desired except hat To # Thv~(~) for every ~l. We get 
around this in the following way, which works quite generally. 
Expand the language by adding a new binary relation R. Let 9.1 be the model for 
this new language in which R is an equivalence relation with infinitely many 
equivalence classes, all infinite, and E is defined so that each R-equivalence class 
is a model of To, with each model ~,  occurring exactly once. Finally, let 
T = Thw(9~). Then all the desired properties hold for essentially the same reasons 
as before. 
Example D1. A complete V::I theory with exactly one a.p. model, which is 
(2, X)-atomic but not (A, ,~)-atomic; (Ro) fails. 
The language has an infinite number of binary predicates P,, n ~ to. The theory 
T says that each P, on its field is just like immediate successor on 7/, and that the 
fields of different P,'s are disjoint. 
A model of T, then has, for each n, some (finite or infinite) number of ;~-chains 
given by P,,, and a set (perhaps empty) of elements not in the field of any P,. T is 
complete since any to-saturated model of T has to have an infinite number of 
chains in each P, as well as infinitely many elements not in the field of any P,. 
T has exactly one a.p. model, namely the model with exactly one chain for each 
P, and everything in ~.he field of some P~. This model 9~ o is easily seen to be 
(.~, 2~)-atomic, but we will show it cannot be (A, 2~)-atomic since 3yPo(x, y) is not 
implied by any A-formula (hence (R~) failsL Let ~ be an elementary extension of 
9Ao adding another Po block, arm let 9A ~ ~_ ~ be a model of T which keeps exactly 
one point ao from the field of Po in 9.I~. Then (~o, ao)---a (9~1, ao) but 3yPo(ao, Y) 
holds in ~o and fails in 9.1~. 
This also shows that x = x is complete for A-formulas but not for existential 
formulas, so (Ro) also fails. 
Example D2, An ~ theory T complete for existential sentences with exactly one 
a.p. model, this a.p. model 9A being weak (~, 2)-atomic but not (~, 2)-mom~c, and 
T = Thva(9~). 
The language has a binary function + • T=Thva((7/, +)). Then (Z, +) is the 
unique a.p. model of T, and it is easily seen to be weak (~, ,F.)-atomic. It is not 
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(If, ,S,)-atomic since 
(Z, +, 1)~3(7Z, +, 2) 
and so no existential formula true of 1 can imply -13y (y +y = x). 
Example D3. A complete universal theory with a (A, If)-atomic mcdel, which is 
not model-complete, has no constants or definable elements, and has no core 
model. 
The language has a binary relation E and infinitely many unary functions 
f,, n ~. a~. The theory T is the theory of Example C3 (that is, a graph with no 
loops) where we add E(x, f, (x)), f. (x)4= ~,,,(x) if n ~ m, and f,(f,  (x))= x for all n. 
T thus becomes universal, since the [,,'s pick out infinitely many points joined to a 
given x to an edge. 
One may easily check that T is complete. It has exactly one a.p. model, namely 
the unique one-generated model, wLich is minimal and hence (A, If)-atomic. This 
is not a core model since it can be mapped into different components of other 
models of T. 
T is not model-complete since there are models 92 with points a, b, c such that 
E(a, b) and E(b, c) hold but b~ ~(a) and b~ T(c) for all terms "r; the submodel of 
92 generated by a and c then makes 3u (E(a, u)AE(u, b)) false although it was 
true in 92. 
Example IM. A complete W'~ theory which is not model-complete and has a 
(za,)2)-atomic model whic!~ is not minimal. 
The language has a unary predicate P, binary predicates < and E, and unary 
functions f,, n E to. The theory T says that on P, E and the [. 's give a model of the 
theory of Example D3, and on 7P, < gives a model of dense linear order without 
endpoints (so x < y ~ ~P(x)/x ~P(y), E(x, y) ---> P(x)/x P(y), and 7P(x) -* f, (x) = 
x all hold). 
Then T is complete and has a (A, ~.)-atomic model, since this is true of both 
halves of T. T is not model-complete (since the P-half isn't) and has no minimal 
model (since the ~P-half  doesn't). 
Example E l .  A universal theory complete for existential sentences with exactly n 
a.p. models (for any 1 < n < to), all weak (if, If)-atomic. 
We describe the theory for n = 2 since the others are entirely similar. 
The language has unary predicates Po, Px and a unary function s. Let 920 be the 
model whose universe is ~o, where s is the usual immediate successor function, Po 
is the set of even integers and P1 is the set of odd integers. Let T be Thv(92o). 
One easily sees that T is complete for existential sentences (since any finite 
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subset of any model of T can be mapped in 9-1o), and ~Io is an a.p. model of "/: 
Let ~t be the submodel of 9.1o generated by 1. qnaen ?It is also a.p. and not 
isomorphic to 9~o, and clearly T has no other a.p. models, 
Example E2. A complete ~ theory wit~ 2 '~ a.p. models. 
Start with the language of one of the complete ~ theories with infinitely many 
a.p. models (Example C1, C2 or C3), and add infinitely many unary predicates 
U,,, n e to. Let T be the theory that says that the U,'s are disjoint and each U,, is 
(the universe of) a model of the theory in whichever one of Example C1, C2 or 
C3 one starts with. Then T is complete, since the theory one starts with is, and 
any model of T in which every U, is an a.p. model of the original theory and in 
which every point belongs to some U, is an a.p, model of T. Since there are 
infinitely many different choices for each U. this yields 2 °, different a.p. models of 
T. 
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